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The current paper seems to provide a useful review of many different delusion 
theories and the paper attempts to incorporate them into an overall framework. 
It seems like this could be a useful review to the field that could help spur future 
delusion theorizing and research.
 
Here are some comments on the paper.
___________________________________________________________________ 
The predictive coding explanation (starting bottom of page 5) does not make 
sense to me. The authors state that “ ‘False’ prediction error signals (which arise 
when a person’s learned expectations conflict with objective sensory input) may 
arise at lower (or higher) levels and can then propagate up (or down) a belief 
hierarchy (a ‘Bayesian hierarchy’) to form delusions.” It is not clear exactly to 
me what this means (and I am not sure if the problem is in the current authors’ 
description or in the original description of the predictive coding view). Is there 
anything else that can be done to explain this theoretical perspective?  
We agree with these comments and have tried to expand this section to explain 
predictive coding more comprehensively and accurately. This section now reads as 
follows (p5): 
An influential account of delusions posits that they arise from a single core 
abnormality in updating beliefs and inferences in a Bayesian (or probabilistic) fashion 
(Adams et al., 2013; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Hohwy, 2013). This account rests on the 
premise that the biological (neural), cognitive and experiential features of delusions are 
all explained through a unitary abnormality in predictive coding. Predictive coding 
refers to a brain process that aims to maximise cognitive efficiency by using prior 
experience to predict incoming sensory information. ‘Surprise’ (or ‘prediction error’) 
may occur when a person’s learned expectations conflict with objective sensory input. 
Cognitive resources are then preferentially allocated to processing this novel 
information (Fletcher & Frith, 2009). This means that novel experiences that are 
consistent with pre-existing beliefs may be ignored or receive less attention due to their 
predictability, while those that are inconsistent with beliefs (and therefore ‘surprising’ 
or interesting) may be preferentially attended to and/or acted upon. 
In delusions, ‘false’ prediction error signals may arise at lower levels in the brain 
and, through cognitive attempts to reduce the prediction-error signal (which indicates 
that pre-existing beliefs are not adequately accounting for the perceived input), 
adjustments will then be made at higher cognitive levels in order to minimise this 
discrepancy. Therefore false prediction error signals are thought to ‘propagate up a 
belief hierarchy’ (a ‘Bayesian hierarchy’) to form delusions. Within a framework of 
assigning certainty, the predictive coding account can be conceptualised as an inability 
to assign certainty at the low/perceptual level, which through bottom-up propagation 
can influence high-level certainty/beliefs. By definition, delusions are fixed false 
beliefs, so involve an impaired ability to update beliefs and inferences that can be 
modelled by a Bayesian (or probabilistic) approach or other statistical approaches to 
modelling change or lack thereof. However,  it is valuable to build the foundation of a 
theoretical account of delusions on evidence of existing emotional and cognitive biases 
that additionally address the phenomenological aspects of delusions, such as why the 
content of delusions are often personally, environmentally and culturally relevant 
(Suhail & Cochrane, 2002), and that have been empirically validated as associated with 
the severity of delusions.
_____________________________________________________________________
I do not think the following statement is accurate (bottom of page 12): “atypical 
antipsychotics, which are effective in attenuating psychotic symptoms, have little 
effect on post-synaptic D2 receptors (Seeman, 2002).” This statement seems to be 
either inaccurate or not supported by research. To quote a recent review by 
Keshavan et al. (2016) on antipsychotic drugs (APDs, including “atypicals”): "all 
currently used APDs still work by reducing dopaminergic neurotransmission" 
(from: "New drug developments in psychosis: Challenges, opportunities and 
strategies"; Progress in Neurobiology). Similarly, in another relatively recent 
review by Miyamoto et al. (2012): "Pharmacologic actions to reduce 
neurotransmission through the D(2) receptor have been the only proven 
therapeutic mechanism for psychoses" (note I added emphasis on the word 
‘only’ in that quote; from: "Pharmacological treatment of schizophrenia: a 
critical review of the pharmacology and clinical effects of current and future 
therapeutic agents"; Molecular Psychiatry). I think this part of the paper 
probably should be revised.
We agree with this comment and have updated the paragraph accordingly:
Furthermore, atypical antipsychotics, which are effective in attenuating psychotic 
symptoms, are thought to work on a number of other neurotransmitter systems (e.g. 
Van der Heijden et al., 2004) in addition to D2 receptor blockade (Keshavan, Lawler, 
Nasrallah, & Tandon, 2016; Miyamoto, Miyake, Jarskog, Fleischhacker, & 
Lieberman, 2012).  This suggests that other mechanisms, such as the serotinergic 
system, may be implicated in delusions through interfering with high and/or low-level 
certainty judgments.
Keshavan, M. S., Lawler, A. N., Nasrallah, H. A., & Tandon, R. (2016). New drug 
developments in psychosis: Challenges, opportunities and strategies. Progress 
in Neurobiology. 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2016.07.004
Miyamoto, S., Miyake, N., Jarskog, L. F., Fleischhacker, W. W., & Lieberman, J. A. 
(2012). Pharmacological treatment of schizophrenia: a critical review of the 
pharmacology and clinical effects of current and future therapeutic 
agents. Molecular Psychiatry, 17(12), 1206-1227. doi: 10.1038/mp.2012.47
Van der Heijden, F. M. M. A., Tuinier, S., Fekkes, D., Sijben, A. E. S., Kahn, R. S., & 
Verhoeven, W. M. A. (2004). Atypical antipsychotics and the relevance of 
glutamate and serotonin. European neuropsychopharmacology, 14(3), 259-265 
doi: 10.1016/j.euroneuro.2003.09.002
_________________________________________________________________
Another place where antipsychotic medication is mentioned that seems 
potentially problematic to me is in the discussion of research by Mizrahi et al. 
2006 (bottom of page 18 & top of page 19), where the authors state: “These 
observations may be a product of more general side effects of neuroleptic 
medication, such as sedation and slower cognitive functioning.” However, I am 
not sure this is consistent with our knowledge about these medications. The 
results of Mizrahi et al. were attempting to account for the effects of 
antipsychotic medications in general. Across antipsychotic medications, based on 
a relatively recent meta-analysis on their treatment and side effects (Leucht et 
al., 2013, Lancet, “Comparative efficacy and tolerability of 15 antipsychotic 
drugs in schizophrenia: a multiple-treatments meta-analysis”), there is a wide 
range of sedating effects, with some causing a prominent increase in sedation 
(e.g., clozapine) and with some causing little if any increase in sedation (e.g., 
amisulpride; paliperidone). However, sedation has little if any relationship to 
antipsychotic efficacy (e.g., amisulpride & paliperidone have the 2nd and 5th 
highest antipsychotic treatment effect size). Hence, at the very least, it is not 
clear whether and how an effect of sedation is relevant to the results of Mizrahi 
et al or for the effects (or lack thereof) of antipsychotic medication on jumping to 
conclusions.  
We have now removed the sentence “These observations may be a product of more 
general side effects of neuroleptic medication, such as sedation and slower cognitive 
functioning.”
____________________________________________________________________
This seems like an odd "theoretical" description (bottom of page 12): "Cognitive 
accounts of delusions involve development of a novel cognitive task that 
measures a cognitive process that should show a degree of empirical association 
with the severity of delusions, and administering that task to a sample of people 
with a range of delusion severity to test the hypothesis." A cognitive “account” 
seems like it should be distinct from the task used to test the account, so it seems 
odd to say that cognitive “accounts” involve development of a task. 
We agree with the reviewer and have now replaced the sentence “Cognitive accounts 
of delusions involve development of a novel cognitive task that measures a cognitive 
process that should show a degree of empirical association with the severity of 
delusions, and administering that task to a sample of people with a range of delusion 
severity to test the hypothesis.”
.. with the following sentence:
“Cognitive models or approaches to delusions usually rely upon behavioural tasks or 
measures to establish an empirical association between a purportedly aberrant 
behaviour or cognitive process and the severity of delusions.”
___________________________________________________________________
I didn’t follow this specific example or how it fits into the broader point of that 
paragraph (on page 4): “On the other hand, arbitrary target objects are 
identified more rapidly when they have previously been presented in a consistent 
location within a particular spatial configuration, due to a learned association 
being formed between the target location and the surrounding context (Chun & 
Jiang, 1998).”
We have now removed this sentence:
“On the other hand, arbitrary target objects are identified more rapidly when they 
have previously been presented in a consistent location within a particular spatial 
configuration, due to a learned association being formed between the target location 
and the surrounding context (Chun & Jiang, 1998)” 
We have also reworded the next sentence from “These experiments demonstrate that” 
to “This seems to indicate that…”
____________________________________________________________________
Editor’s comments 
In addition to addressing the reviewer's comments, I would also like you to 
expand your recommendations for future research.  In my opinion, the value of 
this paper lies in its potential impact on future research and theorizing in the 
field, and I think it is imperative that you provide a modest number of very 
specific predictions and ideas for how they can be tested. 
We have amended the concluding section on page 18-19 to include some specific 
predictions. This section now reads as follows: 
Recommendations for Future Research
Our model may become further refined and updated as more empirical evidence is 
gathered. Future research should aim to explore low-level certainty and high-level 
confidence as two different, but reciprocally related processes in order to further 
establish the neurocognitive processes involved in delusions. Research should also 
progress further beyond the role of dopamine to investigate the role of other 
neurotransmitters in the formation and maintenance of delusions. Knowledge of other 
neurotransmitters relevant to delusions could pave the way for developing more 
effective pharmacological interventions for managing delusional beliefs. Lastly, it 
would be useful to extend research in people who are ‘at risk’ of psychosis to 
explicitly examine brain regions associated with assessment of certainty (e.g. salience 
network). This would be clinically useful as metacognitive training programs which 
specifically target cognitive biases associated with delusions (e.g. JTCs, BADE) show 
promise in terms of reducing biases, belief-related distress and quality of life for 
people with delusions (Moritz et al., 2011; Moritz, Veckenstedt, Randjbar, Vitzthum, 
& Woodward, 2011). Furthermore, cognitive remediation therapy, which teaches 
cognitive flexibility, working memory and planning skills, may also attenuate high-
level cognitive biases and prevent the formation of delusional symptoms (Wykes et 
al., 2007a; Wykes et al., 2007b). Mindfulness training has also been found to directly 
regulate function of the salience network (Zeidan et al., 2011), which could provide a 
low-level intervention for delusions by altering people’s objective perception of their 
environment.
Based on the current paper, future research could test the following specific 
predictions:
1) That high and low-level certainty judgments differ across clinical 
presentations. Aberrant salience, BADE and JTC might be predicted to be more 
severe and prominent in schizophrenia than other presentations such as bipolar 
disorder and psychotic depression. This could be due to the increased delusion 
severity as well as additional cognitive vulnerabilities associated with a schizophrenia 
diagnosis (e.g. memory, attention and executive functioning; Bowie & Harvey, 2006) 
that might further interfere with the capacity to make high and low level certainty 
judgments.
2) That high and low level certainty judgments relate to phenomenological 
differences in the delusional experience. Specifically, biases such as JTC might be 
associated with complex or affective delusions and altered dopamine in the absence 
of higher-level biases may be related to passivity phenomena and delusions of 
reference. 
3) That people with delusions who report more extreme emotions and/or past 
trauma would demonstrate exaggerated alterations in high and low level certainty 
judgments (i.e. increased alterations to the dopaminergic system, aberrant salience 
and cognitive biases). 
4) That specific, monothematic delusions arise from a disrupted dopaminergic 
system and aberrant salience (i.e. low level certainty) but intact high level certainty 
judgments. To that end, that correction of high-level cognitive biases would 
significantly weaken complex delusions, but would have little effect on monothematic 
delusions or passivity phenomena.
Bowie, C. R., & Harvey, P. D. (2006). Cognitive deficits and functional outcome in 
schizophrenia. Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment, 2(4), 531-535.
Moritz, S., Kerstan, A., Veckenstedt, R., Randjbar, S., Vitzthum, F., Schmidt, C., ... 
& Woodward, T. S. (2011). Further evidence for the efficacy of a 
metacognitive group training in schizophrenia. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 49(3), 151-157. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2010.11.010
Moritz, S., Veckenstedt, R., Randjbar, S., Vitzthum, F., & Woodward, T. S. (2011). 
Antipsychotic treatment beyond antipsychotics: metacognitive intervention for 
schizophrenia patients improves delusional symptoms. Psychological 
Medicine, 41(09), 1823-1832. doi: 10.1017/S0033291710002618
Wykes, T., Newton, E., Landau, S., Rice, C., Thompson, N., & Frangou, S. (2007b). 
Cognitive remediation therapy (CRT) for young early onset patients with 
schizophrenia: an exploratory randomized controlled trial. Schizophrenia 
research, 94(1), 221-230. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2007.03.030
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1Abstract
This paper examines the evidence that delusions can be explained within the framework of a 
neurocognitive model of how the brain assesses certainty. Here, ‘certainty’ refers to both low-level 
interpretations of one’s environment and high-level (conscious) appraisals of one’s beliefs and 
experiences. A model is proposed explaining how the brain systems responsible for assigning certainty 
might dysfunction, contributing to the cause and maintenance of delusional beliefs. It is suggested that 
delusions arise through a combination of perturbed striatal dopamine and aberrant salience as well as 
cognitive biases such as the tendency to jump to conclusions (JTC) and hypersalience of evidence-
hypothesis matches. The role of emotion, stress, trauma and sociocultural factors in forming and 
modifying delusions is also considered. Understanding the mechanisms involved in forming and 
maintaining delusions has important clinical implications, as interventions that improve cognitive 
flexibility (e.g. cognitive remediation therapy and mindfulness training) could potentially attenuate 
neurocognitive processes. 
Keywords
Delusions; beliefs; assigning certainty; neurobiological; cognitive; dopamine 
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2Delusional Beliefs 
Delusional beliefs are defined as highly improbable beliefs that are held with strong conviction 
and are not modified in the face of evidence to the contrary (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Delusions are cardinal symptoms of psychosis and present in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, mania 
and psychotic depression, but may also occur in other presentations such as Alzheimer’s disease, 
obsessive compulsive disorder and within the nonclinical population (Cowen, Harrison, & Burns, 
2012). While innocuous delusions are relatively common within the ‘normal’ population (Johns & Van 
Os, 2001), in clinical populations delusions are associated with lower levels of wellbeing (Broyd, 
Jolley, & Johns, 2016; Freeman et al., 2014) and are often accompanied by significant distress, 
depression and anxiety (Smith et al, 2006), particularly if they are persecutory in nature (Freeman, 
Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002). In such cases, people can become highly preoccupied 
with their beliefs, and they can impact significantly on their personal, social and occupational 
functioning (Freeman, 2007). 
People with delusions often report highly compelling subjective experiences (Chapman, 1966), 
even though their beliefs are, by definition, at odds with the environment they have actually 
encountered (Moritz & Woodward, 2006a). This suggests underlying interference in a range of 
metacognitive and neurocognitive systems involved in perception, reasoning, belief formation and the 
appraisal of one’s experiences. In this article we will examine the evidence that delusions can be 
explained within the framework of neurocognitive models of how the brain assesses the certainty of 
perceptions, beliefs and thoughts. We will consider the empirical evidence for these neurocognitive 
models and their limitations.  Finally, based on the existing evidence base, we propose a model 
explaining how alterations in the brain systems responsible for assigning certainty contribute to the 
cause and maintenance of delusional beliefs.
Assigning Certainty
Although ‘assigning certainty’ can be interpreted as a unitary confidence judgment (Fleming, 
Dolan, & Frith, 2012; Insabato, Pannunzi, Rolls, & Deco, 2010; Rolls, Grabenhorst, & Deco, 2010), 
here it will refer to two different but related processes (see White, Engen, Sorensen, Overgaard, & 
Shergill, 2014). Firstly, it will refer to the ability to assign certainty to objective information provided 
by a stimulus, event, behaviour or cognitive state. This involves a ‘low-level’ inference based on the 
perceived characteristics of a stimulus. Secondly, assigning certainty will refer to the subjective 
confidence or feelings of conviction associated with a particular belief or experience. This constitutes a 
3‘high-level’ (conscious) judgment that relies on metacognitive ability (reasoning or beliefs about one’s 
own cognitions) (Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010). Subjective feelings of 
conviction (or certainty) in one’s beliefs will therefore rely both on the quality of perceptual 
information received (e.g. consistent stimulus and lack of interfering brain processes) as well as the 
capacity to self-scrutinise one’s inference.
Bottom-up and Top-down Processing
The ways in which the brain perceives, attends to and processes perceptual information can be 
considered either a ‘top-down’ or a ‘bottom-up’ process (for review see Theeuwes, 2010). Bottom–up 
attentional control is stimulus-driven, i.e. attention is spontaneously oriented towards an incoming 
stimulus. Our high-level beliefs can therefore be conceptualised as being influenced by our low-level 
environmental perceptions through bottom-up processing. In contrast, top–down attentional control is 
intentional and cognitively driven, i.e. directed by knowledge, expectation and current goals 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Top-down processing can conversely be conceptualised as our pre-
existing high-level beliefs and knowledge exerting an influence on low-level perceptions of the 
environment. In simple terms, bottom-up processing leads us to believe what we perceive and top-
down processing leads our perceptions to be biased or altered in line with what we already believe. 
Importantly, top-down and bottom-up processes represent overlapping organizational principles, and 
interact to optimize attentional performance (Sarter, Givens, & Bruno, 2001) but are associated with 
different brain networks (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). 
Perceptions therefore arise from an interaction between ‘top-down’ functions (e.g. learned 
expectations, hypotheses and reasoning) and objective stimulus data (Delorme, Rousselet, Macé, & 
Fabre-Thorpe, 2004; Mechelli, Price, Friston, & Ishai, 2004). According to such a model, it is possible 
for ‘top-down’ goals to influence the perception of one’s environment (Theeuwes, 2010). A classic 
example of this is the slower and less accurate recognition that arises when an object presented in a 
particular scene violates the surrounding contextual information or is of an inappropriate size or 
location (e.g. a fire extinguisher sitting directly on top of a post box in a street scene) (Biederman, 
Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982). This seems to indicate that contextual cueing or ‘priming’ can 
influence perception in a top-down fashion.
 
4Theoretical Accounts of Delusions
A number of theoretical accounts have been put forward to explain delusions. As they are 
theoretical frameworks, they do not require evidence of empirical association with the severity of 
delusions. However, as will be addressed below, some have been tested empirically. 
Aberrant Perceptions
It has been suggested that delusional beliefs arise as a secondary response to aberrant or 
erroneous perceptions (Escher, Romme, Buiks, Delespaul, & van Os, 2002; Krabbendam et al., 2004). 
For example, Maher (Maher, 2005, 2006) argues that “bizarre” or delusional interpretations are a 
rational response to anomalous but genuine sensory experiences such as auditory or visual 
hallucinations that are also common in psychosis (Nayani & David, 1996). This account is consistent 
with the idea that certainty judgments can be erroneous at a basic low-level perceptual inferences level, 
which, then alter subjective high-level interpretations (i.e. arising through bottom-up processes). This 
seems consistent with the experiences of people with highly specific or ‘monothematic’ delusions. One 
such example is the ‘Capgras delusion’, which involves the highly compelling and specific belief that a 
friend or family member has been replaced by an imposter (in the absence of psychosis elsewhere) 
(Ellis, Young, Quayle, & De Pauw, 1997). The Capgras delusion has been explained through 
disconnection between an intact face recognition system and an intact autonomic nervous system. 
According to this account, the delusion arises from the patient attempting to explain the anomalous 
experience of recognising a familiar face in the absence of the usual affective response associated to 
that face (Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2007; Coltheart, Menzies, & Sutton, 2010; Davies, Breen, 
Coltheart, & Langdon, 2001). This leads familiar faces to be perceived as strangers through 
dysfunctional bottom-up processes. However, a purely bottom-up explanation of delusions does not 
seem to account for delusional beliefs in the absence of perceptual disturbance (e.g. hallucinations), 
fails to account for the experiential qualities of delusions, and equally fails to explain why some 
unusual experiences and perceptions do not develop into delusions (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2008; 
Hohwy, 2004; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). 
An alternative account proposes that pre-existing beliefs and reasoning and attentional biases 
may exert a ‘top-down’ influence to alter one’s perception of sensory information (Adams, Stephan, 
Brown, Frith, & Friston, 2013; Fletcher & Frith, 2009). For example, Campbell (2001) disagrees that 
monothematic delusions arise through bottom-up processes, arguing instead that beliefs such as the 
Capgras delusion would not occur without a disruption of the top-down loading of one’s fundamental 
5beliefs influencing one’s perceptual experience. For example, feelings of familiarity and memories 
associated with a particular person may be impaired at higher levels, which could alter perceptions of 
the person in a top-down fashion (Bayne & Pacherie, 2004). This account would suggest that delusions 
may arise through high-level certainty judgments influencing sensory experiences in a top-down way, 
although there is no convincing empirical evidence to support that monothematic delusions arise in this 
way. 
Predictive Coding
An influential account of delusions posits that they arise from a single core abnormality in 
updating beliefs and inferences in a Bayesian (or probabilistic) fashion (Adams et al., 2013; Fletcher & 
Frith, 2009; Hohwy, 2013). This account rests on the premise that the biological (neural), cognitive 
and experiential features of delusions are all explained through a unitary abnormality in predictive 
coding. Predictive coding refers to a brain process that aims to maximise cognitive efficiency by using 
prior experience to predict incoming sensory information. ‘Surprise’ (or ‘prediction error’) may occur 
when a person’s learned expectations conflict with objective sensory input. Cognitive resources are 
then preferentially allocated to processing this novel information (Fletcher & Frith, 2009). This means 
that novel experiences that are consistent with pre-existing beliefs may be ignored or receive less 
attention due to their predictability, while those that are inconsistent with beliefs (and therefore 
‘surprising’ or interesting) may be preferentially attended to and/or acted upon. 
In delusions, ‘false’ prediction error signals may arise at lower levels in the brain and, through 
cognitive attempts to reduce the prediction-error signal (which indicates that pre-existing beliefs are 
not adequately accounting for the perceived input), adjustments will then be made at higher cognitive 
levels in order to minimise this discrepancy. Therefore false prediction error signals are thought to 
‘propagate up a belief hierarchy’ (a ‘Bayesian hierarchy’) to form delusions. Within a framework of 
assigning certainty, the predictive coding account can be conceptualised as an inability to assign 
certainty at the low/perceptual level, which through bottom-up propagation can influence high-level 
certainty/beliefs. By definition, delusions are fixed false beliefs, so involve an impaired ability to 
update beliefs and inferences, that can be modelled by a Bayesian (or probabilistic) approach or other 
statistical approaches to modelling change or lack thereof. However, it is valuable to build the 
foundation of a theoretical account of delusions on evidence of existing emotional and cognitive biases 
that additionally address the phenomenological aspects of delusions, such as why the content of 
delusions are often personally, environmentally and culturally relevant (Suhail & Cochrane, 2002), and 
that have been empirically validated as associated with the severity of delusions.
6The Two-Factor Theory
Another account posits that two factors are necessary for the development and maintenance of 
delusions. The first factor accounts for the content of a delusion, and may include the perceptual 
aberrations discussed above, which can lead to the development of delusional hypotheses through a 
bottom-up process. Due to the varied content of delusions, it is assumed that this first factor varies 
from delusion to delusion, and it is this first factor that initially prompts the delusional belief 
(Coltheart, Langdon & McKay, 2007). The second factor accounts for why this delusional hypothesis, 
once formulated, is adopted and maintained despite the availability of potentially overwhelming 
counter-evidence (Coltheart et al., 2007; Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011; Davies, Coltheart, 
Langdon, & Breen, 2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005a). The 
nature of this second factor has been modified gradually over time; early attempts to conceptualise it 
maintained that it was an “all-or-none” deficit present in delusional people but absent in healthy 
individuals (Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). It is now considered to be a neurocognitive impairment at 
the extreme end of a belief evaluation continuum (McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005b). This 
impairment in belief evaluation is thought to explain why delusional beliefs are adopted and why they 
persist, and are so resistant to rational counter-argument (Coltheart et al., 2011). Moreover, unlike the 
first factor which varies according to delusional content, it is assumed that this second factor remains 
constant and will be present regardless of the specific delusional theme (Coltheart et al., 2011). There 
is also preliminary neurological evidence to suggest that this second factor is associated with damage 
to the right lateral prefrontal cortex (Coltheart et al., 2007). The rationale for incorporating the second 
factor arose from evidence from neuropsychological patients with damage to brain areas that influence 
their perceptual systems, but who do not exhibit the delusions that one might expect if delusions were 
exclusively generated through a bottom-up process (whereby the belief is generated through 
rationalising aberrant low-level perceptions). For example, Tranel et al. (1995) reported how patients 
with damage to their orbitofrontal cortex showed impaired autonomic nervous system responses to 
familiar faces, but did not develop the Capgras delusion. This suggests that high-level factors must be 
implicated in addition to low-level perceptual processes. Therefore this account posits that delusions 
are formed through disruption to a combination of both low and high-level certainty judgments, but 
unlike the unitary predictive coding model, the first low-level factor is a necessary precursor for 
delusions to arise. While the two-factor theory is helpful in conceptualising specific monothematic 
delusions in neuropsychological patients, the high-level belief evaluation component or ‘second factor’ 
seems insufficient in explaining delusions in psychosis, which often reflect personal experiences of 
trauma and persecution (Reiff, Castille, Muenzenmaier, & Link, 2012; Thompson et al., 2010) as well 
as an individual’s social and cultural context (Cannon & Kramer, 2012; Catone, Pisano, Broome, 
7Lindau, Pascotto, & Gritti, 2016). This would suggest that a model that acknowledges the involvement 
of pre-existing beliefs and experiences might provide a more parsimonious explanation of delusions. 
Interactionist Account of Delusions
Young (2008) attempted to consolidate previous theories by explaining the aforementioned 
‘Capgras delusion’ in the context of a bi-directional interaction between bottom-up and top-down 
processes. By this account, cognitive deficits and phenomenological aspects of the Capgras delusion 
actually cause the person’s experience of their friend or family member to be restructured so that they 
align with their beliefs. In other words, the experiential qualities of the delusion serve to validate the 
belief held regarding the friend or family member (in a bottom-up fashion) but the belief also 
reciprocally provides authenticity to the experiential qualities in a top-down way. The interactionist 
account clearly fits with the idea that delusions may arise from aberrance in assigning certainty at both 
high and low-levels in the brain, and through reciprocal interactions between top-down and bottom-up 
processes. While the model should be commended for incorporating delusional phenomenology, it has 
only been applied to explain this rare and specific delusion, lacks an empirical evidence base, and 
therefore may differ across disorders or other types of delusion.
Neuroscientific Accounts of Delusions
Neuroscientific accounts of delusions involve putting forward a biological mechanism combined 
with a cognitive concept, with the degree of empirical association with the severity of delusions not 
required but sometimes collected. 
Dopamine and Aberrant Salience
Although no clear neurocognitive model of certainty judgements exists, a number of 
neurobiological systems are thought to be involved in this process and dysregulation of these systems 
may lead to the development of delusion beliefs. Elevated dopamine synthesis is widely reported in 
individuals with psychosis (Dao-Castellana et al., 1997; Laruelle, Abi-Dargham, Gil, Kegeles, & Innis, 
1999; Lindstrom et al., 1999; Reith et al., 1994). Indeed, Howes et al. (2011) found that striatal 
dopamine increases progressively as psychosis develops. Although this does not necessarily imply a 
causal relationship between dopamine and psychosis, meta-analyses have revealed strong evidence for 
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Howes, Kambeitz, Kim, & et al., 2012). Furthermore, as antipsychotic medication is often effective in 
attenuating psychotic symptoms (Howes & Kapur, 2009) and amphetamines are able to induce 
psychosis in healthy volunteers (Angrist & Gershon, 1970; Yui, Ikemoto, Ishiguro, & Goto, 2000) 
(both of which act on dopamine receptors in the striatum), this suggests that altered dopaminergic 
neurotransmission may underlie psychosis specifically. 
Dopamine neurons are implicated in processing rewarding (Schultz, 2002; Wise, 2004) and 
novel (Ljungberg, Apicella, & Schultz, 1992) stimuli, including objects, behaviours or internal states 
(Winton-Brown, Fusar-Poli, Ungless, & Howes, 2014). The ‘aberrant salience hypothesis’ (Kapur, 
2003, 2004; Kapur, Mizrahi, & Li, 2005) proposes that a hyperactive dopamine system in the midbrain 
and striatum (Davis, Kahn, Ko, & Davidson, 1991; Seeman & Kapur, 2000) leads to contextually 
irrelevant salience attribution in response to otherwise non-salient stimuli and internal representations. 
Specifically, people diagnosed with schizophrenia seem to assign excessive salience to contextually-
irrelevant events, but show dampened salience attribution in response to conventionally salient stimuli 
(Kapur et al., 2005; Murray et al., 2008; Roiser et al., 2009). As such, perturbed striatal dopamine 
function may disrupt the ability to revise or update beliefs in a ‘Bayesian’ (Fienberg, 2006; Mathys, 
Daunizeau, Friston, & Stephan, 2011) or probabilistic fashion (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Hemsley & 
Garety, 1986). This refers to the inferential process of updating beliefs through integrating new 
evidence with pre-existing knowledge or schemas about the world. The aberrant salience hypothesis 
can equally be explained by delusions arising through disruption to a person’s ability to assign high-
level certainty to one’s experiences in a top-down fashion. Tasks assessing salience tend to compare 
patients with psychosis or schizophrenia to healthy controls (e.g. Jensen et al., 2008; Murray et al., 
2008) rather than assessing the specific association between salience and delusion severity. Notably, 
Roiser et al. (2013) reported a positive correlation between the degree of aberrant salience and 
delusion-like symptoms in a sample of people at high risk of developing psychosis. This provides 
evidence for a link between aberrant salience and delusions specifically, that is not confounded by the 
effects of illness and medication (e.g. Abboud et al., 2016).
Dopamine and Prediction Error
Prediction-error arises when there is a mismatch between what a person expects (based on a 
learned probabilistic estimation from prior evidence) and the actual sensory input (Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972). In the brain, such a discrepancy or ‘surprise’ is expressed through the dopaminergic-dependent 
prediction-error signal in the striatum when the surprise is related to rewarding stimuli (Hollerman & 
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nigostriatal dopamine neurons also respond to the presentation of non-rewarding novel stimuli 
(Horvitz, 2000). To reconcile these neurobiological observations with neurocognitive models, it could 
be argued that the dopamine mediated prediction error is generated when there is a mismatch between 
bottom-up perceptual evidence/low-level certainty and top-down pre-existing beliefs/high-level 
certainty (Fletcher & Frith, 2009). Accordingly, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
have identified abnormal striatal prediction-error signals on associative learning tasks in people with 
psychosis (Jensen et al., 2008), even when they are medication naïve (Murray et al., 2008; 
Schlagenhauf et al., 2014). For example, whilst controls show robust activation in the dopaminergic 
midbrain and ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra (containing dopaminergic cell bodies projecting 
to the striatum) in response to rewarding stimuli, medication-naïve patients actually exhibit greater 
activation in response to neutral stimuli and reduced activation patterns in response to rewarding 
stimuli (Murray et al., 2008). Furthermore, the extent of prediction-error disruption in people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia also seems to be significantly associated with the tendency to form 
delusions (Corlett et al., 2007; Gradin et al., 2011). Delusions may act as an explanation for the 
‘sensory overload’ and confusion that occurs when novel and salient stimuli conflict with existing 
mental representations and beliefs over long time periods (Winton-Brown et al., 2014). Therefore, 
within a framework of assigning certainty and according to the Dopamine and Prediction Error 
account, delusions arise from the mind rationalising these abnormal perceptual experiences, aberrantly 
assigning certainty via a stimulus-driven bottom-up route. Perturbed striatal dopamine function, 
prediction errors and aberrant salience may also affect hippocampally mediated episodic memory 
formation and long term potentiation (Lisman & Grace, 2005), a process thought to be crucial during 
the development of psychosis (Modinos, Allen, Grace, & McGuire, 2015). It is possible that impaired 
episodic memory formation impacts on belief formation and systems that ultimately feed and maintain 
delusions. 
Salience Network
Neuroimaging studies have also revealed disruption to the neural substrate thought to orient 
attention to salient stimuli in people with schizophrenia (regardless of delusional symptom profile) 
compared with controls; namely the ‘frontal salience network’, comprising the bilateral insula and 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (Menon, 2011; Seeley et al., 2007; White, Joseph, Francis, & Liddle, 
2010). There seems to be converging evidence indicating that the salience network is activated by 
orienting stimuli. A detailed review by Menon (2011) highlights how the salience network is 
consistently coactive with task-specific regions when stimuli are modulated in terms of cognitive, 
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emotional and homeostatic salience, suggesting they fundamentally code salience. Furthermore a 
meta-analysis by White et al. (2014) demonstrated that the brain regions most consistently activated in 
times of environmental uncertainty were the salience and central executive network. Studies also show 
that the salience network is important for response inhibition (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & 
Robbins, 2003; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004), suggesting that the salience network is activated 
early and the signal it generates codes whether or not an individual should respond. There is robust 
evidence of grey matter volumetric reductions in the anterior cingulate and anterior insula in patients 
with schizophrenia relative to controls (Baiano et al., 2007; Honea, Crow, Passingham, & Mackay, 
2005; Palaniyappan, Mallikarjun, Joseph, White, & Liddle, 2011). Furthermore, volume alterations in 
these areas are significantly correlated with severity of delusions (Palaniyappan et al., 2011). 
Functional MRI has also identified dysregulation of the salience network in schizophrenia on a reward-
related learning task (White, Gilleen, & Shergill, 2013). This paper also found that in healthy controls, 
but not people with schizophrenia, the salience network was more active when stimuli carried more 
incentive salience than at times when they carried less incentive salience. Roiser and colleagues (2013) 
also found that both aberrant salience and ventral striatal responses were related to delusion severity in 
people at ultra high risk of psychosis. These studies further suggest that delusions may involve both 
structural and functional disruption to the salience network. The meta-analysis by White et al. (2014) 
has also corroborated that the salience network responds specifically to low-level environmental 
uncertainty in healthy volunteers, assessed through tasks that modulate predictability of environmental 
stimuli (e.g. rewards-based, gambling, probability based tasks).  It is conceivable that disruption to the 
salience network might interfere with low-level perceptual/certainty judgments, giving rise to 
delusions through bottom-up processing (consistent with the ‘aberrant perceptions’ theoretical account 
of delusions).   
Other Neurobiological Processes
Neuroimaging studies in people with schizophrenia have revealed altered function, volume and 
connectivity in a range of brain regions, including the prefrontal cortex (Barch, Carter, Braver, & et al., 
2001; Weinberger, Berman, & Zec, 1986), the medial temporal lobe (Wright et al., 2000), the anterior 
cingulate cortex (Kerns et al., 2005), language regions (Woodward, Tipper, Leung, Lavigne, Sanford, 
& Metzak, 2015; Lavigne el al., 2015) and ‘default mode network’ (a network spanning the ventral 
medial prefrontal cortex, the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus 
and the lateral parietal cortex) (Garrity et al., 2007; Woodward et al., 2016; Lavigne et al., 2015). It is 
not clear at present how striatal dopamine dysregulation might contribute to functional alterations in 
these other regions. However, it seems there are multiple systems and networks involved in delusion 
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formation and maintenance (although there may well be a single unitary developmental pathology up-
stream giving rise to these alterations). It is therefore also important not to discount the role of other 
neurotransmitters, which may contribute to delusions through interactions in complex neurocircuits. 
For example, hyperactivity in the hippocampus due to dysregulation of glutamatergic and GABAergic 
systems, leads to increased ‘downstream’ dopamine in the striatum and midbrain (Lodge & Grace, 
2011), possibly disrupting the detection of novel/salient stimuli (Modinos et al., 2015). Acetylcholine 
(Martin & Freedman, 2007) and noradrenaline (Yamamoto & Hornykiewicz, 2004) also seem to be 
implicated in psychosis and warrant further empirical attention in relation to delusions. Furthermore, 
atypical antipsychotics, which are effective in attenuating psychotic symptoms, are thought to work on 
a number of other neurotransmitter systems (e.g. Van der Heijden et al., 2004) in addition to D2 
receptor blockade (Keshavan, Lawler, Nasrallah, & Tandon, 2016; Miyamoto, Miyake, Jarskog, 
Fleischhacker, & Lieberman, 2012).  This suggests that other mechanisms, such as the serotinergic 
system, may be implicated in delusions through interfering with high and/or low-level certainty 
judgments.
Cognitive Accounts of Delusions
Cognitive models or approaches to delusions usually rely upon behavioural tasks or measures to 
establish an empirical association between a purportedly aberrant behaviour or cognitive process and 
the severity of delusions. Some studies report a difference between delusional and non-delusional 
patients (e.g. Moritz & Woodward, 2005), some report no difference (e.g. Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 
2010), and some do not report whether or not there is a difference and base conclusion on the 
difference between patients with psychosis and healthy controls (e.g. So et al., 2012). Clearly the 
strongest evidence for the validity of a cognitive test in measuring a cognitive process underlying 
delusions lies in this empirical association.
Jumping to Conclusions
In order to comprehensively explain how certainty judgments might break down to cause 
delusions, a satisfactory theory ought to bridge the gap between neuronal and cognitive processes. 
Bayesian inferencing can be explored behaviourally using probabilistic reasoning tasks such as the 
‘bead task’ (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988). Here, participants are typically presented with two jars 
containing complementary ratios of coloured beads. The jars are then hidden from view and beads are 
drawn one at a time from one jar. After each draw, participants are required to estimate which jar the 
bead has been drawn from and the task is terminated when they have arrived at a final decision. The 
key prediction is that individuals with delusions express a bias towards estimating from which jar the 
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beads have been taken with greater certainty and/or more rapidly (e.g. fewer ‘draws to decision’) than 
healthy control subjects. This tendency to make hasty decisions based on little evidence has been 
termed the ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) bias (Garety & Freeman, 2013) and reflects an abnormality 
in assigning appropriate metacognitive confidence to events (a high-level cognitive process). 
The JTC bias is the most replicated bias correlated with delusions in the literature to date, and 
has generated four recently published meta-analyses. The Dudley, Taylor, Wickham, and Hutton 
(2015) meta-analysis, which included previously unpublished data from 16 authors, confirmed the 
association between JTC bias on the beads task and clinical delusions. A trend-level inverse 
relationship between data gathering and delusion severity was identified and the JTC bias was also 
associated with increased probability of delusion occurrence in psychosis. People with psychosis were 
also found to request less evidence to make decisions and were significantly more like to display 
‘extreme responding’ compared with both healthy individuals and people with non-psychotic mental 
health problems. The meta-analysis by So, Siu, Wong, Chan, and Garety (2016) concluded that JTC is 
not a transdiagnostic phenomenon beyond psychosis. Similarly, McLean, Mattiske, and Balzan (2016) 
found that the JTC bias is associated specifically with delusions rather than with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia or another psychiatric disorder, consistent with the possibility that it contributes to 
delusional severity. Finally, a meta-analysis looking at data-gathering biases on the beads task within 
the general population found a small significant JTC effect within healthy but ‘delusion-prone’ 
samples, which minimises the confounding effects of psychosis (e.g., working memory deficits) and 
medication (Ross, McKay, Coltheart, & Langdon, 2015). Collectively, this meta-analytic data suggests 
that hasty decision-making is a genuine core abnormality in delusional/delusion-prone individuals and 
adds to the evidence that aberrant assignment of high-level certainty to one’s beliefs or hypotheses can 
contribute to delusions in a top-down fashion. 
Despite the apparent consistency across the JTC literature, it also worth noting that several 
individual studies did not yield significant differences between delusional and non-delusional groups 
on measures of JTC. This has led some researchers to conclude that there may be challenges associated 
with accurately measuring JTC with the ‘beads task’. For example, Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, and 
Woodward (2012a) showed that miscomprehension is a potential confound of the bead task, whereby 
people may incorrectly assume that the purpose of the task is to determine where the current bead  is 
coming from rather than the bead sequence. 
Hypersalience of Evidence-Hypothesis Matches 
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An alternative approach which aimed to addresses the potential methodological issues of the 
beads task required participants to provide probability estimates that a fisherman was fishing from two 
different lakes; Lake A or Lake B (Speechley, Whitman, & Woodward, 2010). Separate rating scales 
are presented for each lake, as opposed to using one scale (e.g. Lake A at one end and Lake B at the 
other end of the scale), as is often used in other JTC paradigms. The conventional single scale forces 
probability estimates for each lake to be reciprocal, for example, if a fish is rated as 30% likely to 
come from Lake A, the participant must automatically choose that it is 70% likely to come from Lake 
B, resulting in loss of information regarding a person’s reasoning skills. Two scales allow separate 
measures of lakes, one matching the caught fish (e.g. black fish caught and mostly black fish in the 
lake) and one not matching the caught fish, (e.g. black fish caught and mostly white fish in the lake). 
Participants with active delusions rated ‘matching lakes’ significantly higher earlier in the sequence 
than all non-delusion groups; however, there were no differences between delusional and non-
delusional groups for ‘non-matching lakes’. This suggests that the core cognitive operation underlying 
the JTC bias may be a ‘hypersalience of ‘evidence-hypothesis’ (EVH) matches; that is, data-gathering 
might cease to occur because the first evidence-hypothesis matches are deemed to be sufficient to 
make a definite decision. A series of experiments have further validated this mechanism across a 
number of other cognitive biases, whereby people with delusions were consistently shown to overvalue 
and attach excessive weight to ‘EVH (evidence-hypothesis) matches’ whilst considering non-matches 
normally (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 2012b; Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & 
Woodward, 2013; Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 2013). 
Liberal Acceptance 
It is possible that JTC may also be mediated by other processes. For example, studies have 
shown that the JTC bias occurs only in situations of relatively low ambiguity (Moritz et al., 2016; 
Moritz & Woodward, 2004; Moritz, Woodward, Jelinek, & Klinge, 2008; Moritz, Woodward, & 
Lambert, 2007). For example, while patients diagnosed with schizophrenia show a JTC bias when 
presented with two jars, the effect seems to disappear when they are presented with four jars (Moritz et 
al., 2007). This ‘liberal acceptance’ (LA) account posits that multiple alternatives with similar ratios 
(higher ambiguity) abolishes the JTC effect in psychosis (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). This would 
reflect a lower threshold for making decisions, which may be surpassed in the face of relatively limited 
evidence in favour of one particular option. It therefore seems that in psychosis, subjective feelings of 
confidence can be inappropriately high even when presented with tentative and unreliable 
environmental evidence. 
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Maintenance Factors
Much of the literature fails to account for why delusional beliefs continue to be maintained with 
such confidence and inflexibility, despite unequivocal environmental evidence to the contrary. 
Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, and Bebbington (2002) argue that persecutory delusions may 
become ingrained through selectively focusing on evidence that appears consistent with the belief, also 
known as ‘confirmation bias’. This may involve low-level biases in memory, cognition and attention 
(e.g. potential hyperactivation in the salience network), which orient the individual towards threatening 
or belief confirming information (for review see Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994). For example, 
on evidence-hypothesis matching tasks, people diagnosed with schizophrenia, as well as non-clinical 
delusion-prone participants, show greater bias in their search for confirming evidence, rate confirming 
evidence as more important than disconfirming evidence and remember the confirming evidence more 
readily than disconfirming evidence compared with non-clinical controls (Balzan et al., 2013a). 
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that people with severe delusions are less willing to integrate 
evidence that disconfirms their interpretations, and it has been proposed that delusions may be 
maintained through this ‘bias against disconfirmatory evidence’ (BADE), whereby evidence against 
the belief is not fully integrated. People with delusions have demonstrated being less able to adjust 
their beliefs to be more tenable when providing interpretations of neutral scenarios compared with 
healthy volunteers and psychiatric controls (Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007; Woodward, 
Moritz, & Chen, 2006; Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whitman, 2006; Woodward, Moritz, Menon, & 
Klinge, 2008). Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis by McLean et al., 2016 has demonstrated that 
BADE is associated with severity of delusions. A hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis matches may 
contribute to this impaired integration of new disambiguating information, as previously strengthened 
evidence-hypothesis matches may be more resistant to change or re-evaluation, whilst disconfirmatory 
evidence, which does not match initial assumptions, is given substantially less emphasis. This effect 
for patients with delusions may also be exacerbated with self-generated beliefs (Whitman et al., 2013). 
This may explain how aberrant ability to assign subjective high-level certainty to one’s beliefs can 
serve to maintain and strengthen them.
Interestingly, Joyce, Averbeck, Frith, and Shergill (2013) found that patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia actually apply similar weight to new evidence as healthy controls, but rather tend to 
‘leak’ previous (or older) evidence. On a computerised probabilistic reasoning game, patients struggled 
to detect regularities in their opponent’s play, even when the pattern was obvious. Nevertheless, they 
still expressed overconfidence in their responses, which were skewed towards favouring newer 
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evidence with more immediate rewards. Based on their findings, Joyce et al. (2013) posit that 
delusions may arise through a breakdown in metacognitive ability to assign certainty (JTC bias and 
overweighting of recent evidence) and are maintained due to inability to integrate temporal 
information appropriately, which may be due to metamemory deficits in schizophrenia (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2006b). However, this finding seems to contradict the aforementioned evidence that 
people with delusions fail to integrate novel disambiguating evidence rather than over-incorporating it.  
If newer evidence were consistently favoured in psychosis, one might expect delusional beliefs to be 
transiently extinguished when objective environmental evidence conflicts with erroneous pre-existing 
beliefs. The fixed and chronic nature of delusions suggests that this is not the case (Tandon et al., 
2009). As previously mentioned, people with delusions seem to express a hypersalience towards new 
(hypothesis matching) evidence (leading to the JTC bias). Perhaps evidence-hypothesis matches 
encountered on the first piece of evidence persist because this initial information remains displayed 
throughout the remainder of the trial. This provides a potential explanation for the BADE effect and 
implies that for people with delusions, under everyday, complex decision-making conditions, initial 
hypothesis-matching evidence may over-ride novel hypothesis-nonmatching evidence. This would 
suggest that high-level certainty judgments can exert a top-down influence on perceptual or low-level 
environmental evidence, consistent with the ‘Predictive Coding’ or ‘Interactionist’ theoretical accounts 
of delusions. Further work is needed to clarify this set of results.
Other Cognitive Biases
It is possible that other cognitive biases influence the ability to self-scrutinise one’s belief 
(Salvatore et al., 2012). For example, delusional beliefs could arise from overconfidence in errors 
(Balzan, 2016; Moritz, Woodward, Whitman, & Cuttler, 2005) when making subjective judgments 
regarding mental states (Kother et al., 2012). Other cognitive biases that may influence high-level 
confidence estimations include intolerance of ambiguity (McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006), a bias 
favouring self-selected hypotheses (Whitman, Menon, Kuo, & Woodward, 2013) and dichotomous or 
‘all or nothing’ thinking styles (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001). Certain types 
of neurocognitive processes may be related to different types of delusions. For example, biases such as 
JTC may be related to a top-down phenomenology (e.g. complex or affective delusions), whilst altered 
dopamine in the absence of higher-level biases may be related to a bottom-up phenomenology such as 
passivity phenomena. 
Dopamine and Cognitive Biases
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There is conflicting evidence as to whether dopamine plays a role in influencing higher level 
certainty judgments, such as JTC. A study by Lou et al. (2011) explored whether increased dopamine 
neurotransmission in healthy individuals would mediate subjective confidence on a visual perception 
task. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either Pergolide (a dopamine agonist) or placebo 
prior to the task. Increased dopaminergic transmission was associated with significantly higher 
confidence ratings than placebo, suggesting that elevated dopamine may be implicated in over-
assigning subjective (high-level) certainty to events. This finding is paralleled by a study by Andreou, 
Moritz, Veith, Veckenstedt, and Naber (2013) which found that the number of high confidence 
incorrect responses reduced when healthy participants were given haloperidol; a dopamine antagonist, 
which reduces dopamine transmission by blocking post synaptic D2 receptors. However, the same 
study found that neither increases nor reductions in dopamine transmission had any effect on the JTC 
bias. Another study by Ermakova, Ramachandra, Corlett, Fletcher, and Murray (2014) similarly 
reported no effect on the draws to decision aspect of the JTC bias under administration of another 
dopamine agonist, methamphetamine. However, Menon and colleagues (2008) found that patients who 
initiated their antipsychotic medication subsequently demonstrated less hasty decision-making and 
decreased intensity of delusions. Mizrahi et al. (2006) found that dopaminergic antipsychotic treatment 
has little effect on delusional conviction in people with psychosis, but rather works by dampening 
symptoms through detaching people from their experiences. These mixed findings suggest there is 
insufficient evidence at present to confirm that higher-level processes are directly affected by aberrant 
dopamine. However, it remains plausible that dopamine could influence higher-level explanations and 
certainty judgments through altering perceptual/low-level experiences in delusions via a bottom-up 
process, which could be tested empirically. 
Emotion, Stress, Trauma and Sociocultural Factors
Emotion seems to be intrinsically linked to delusions (Freeman et al., 2002; Garety & Freeman, 
2013) and may influence the way in which certainty is assigned to one’s perceptions and thoughts. 
Persecutory delusions by their very nature involve themes of negative affect (Freeman et al., 2013; 
Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001) and depression and low self-esteem are associated with severity of 
persecutory delusions (Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Smith et al., 2006). Delusions of grandiosity, on the 
other hand, are associated with higher self-esteem, lower depression and lower anxiety (Garety et al., 
2013; Smith et al., 2006). It therefore seems that delusions are a direct manifestation of an individual’s 
underlying emotional concerns (Freeman & Garety, 2003). Interestingly, state anxiety increases both 
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paranoid ideation and the JTC bias in healthy participants (Lincoln, Lange, Burau, Exner, & Moritz, 
2010), suggesting that transient emotional states may be sufficiently powerful to influence high-level 
subjective decisions. It seems likely that emotion may influence bottom-up processing through 
interacting with other cognitive processes such as attentional control to influence severity, content and 
appraisal of delusional beliefs. 
Trauma, drug use and socioeconomic status are related to delusional ideation in the general 
population (Saha, Scott, Varghese, & McGrath, 2012; Saha, Scott, Varghese, & McGrath, 2013; Saha 
et al., 2011) and there is very strong evidence for a link between trauma and psychosis (Read, 
Morrison & Ross, 2005). It is therefore possible that social, cultural and environmental factors interact 
with neurocognitive processes involved in assigning certainty, to elicit, exacerbate or determine the 
theme of delusional beliefs. Delusions in psychosis are often persecutory in nature, and evidence 
suggests there are parallels between past experiences (e.g. trauma) and delusional themes (Reiff, 
Castille, Muenzenmaier, & Link, 2012; Thompson et al., 2010). Furthermore, the content of delusions 
tends to change across time periods and according to cultural and societal norms (Cannon & Kramer, 
2012; Catone, Pisano, Broome, Lindau, Pascotto, & Gritti, 2016), suggesting that life experiences and 
pre-existing beliefs are implicated in delusions. Furthermore, stress can directly contribute to 
exaggerated dopamine release in psychosis (Mizrahi et al., 2012), which could therefore contribute to 
delusions through influencing low-level certainty judgments. Acute psychosocial stress and drugs of 
abuse have also been found to increase strength at excitatory synapses on dopamine neurons in the 
mid-brain of mice (Saal, Dong, Bonci, & Malenka, 2003). Moreover many drugs of addiction 
specifically work by increasing dopamine action in the brain (Wise & Hoffman, 1992). This draws 
parallels with the hyper-responsive dopaminergic system in psychosis, which is also reported to occur 
in brain areas such as the striatum (Kapur, 2003). It seems therefore that external and environmental 
factors may be able to influence the dopaminergic system as well as high-level certainty judgments, 
giving rise to psychosis and in particular, delusional beliefs, through both bottom-up and top-down 
processes.
A Model for Delusion Formation and Maintenance
We propose an integrative model whereby delusions arise through reciprocal top-down and 
bottom-up interactions between disrupted low and high-level certainty judgments. The model 
emphasises empirically tested factors and integrates the existing evidence base to conceptualise how 
delusions might be formed and maintained. 
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Insert Figure 1 here
Figure 1: Summary model of the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs.
Firstly, a perturbed dopaminergic system assigns abnormal salience (a low-level certainty 
judgment) to perceptual information (Kapur, 2003). This process may be supported and reinforced by 
hyperactivation in ‘bottom-up’ attentional systems (i.e. salience network) and may orient attention 
towards particularly threatening or anxiety-provoking environmental stimuli. This comes from 
evidence suggesting salience network alterations in the brains of people with delusions. External 
factors such as stress, state anxiety and drugs may influence the dopamine system and thereby increase 
propensity to assign inappropriate salience to experiences (Saal et al., 2003). Cognitive factors 
including JTC bias (mediated via a mechanism of liberal acceptance and hypersalience of evidence-
hypothesis matching) also interfere with the ability to assign confidence to experienced perceptual 
events in a top-down fashion. For example, reduced top-down influence on sensory input which 
prevents new information from being appropriately integrated with existing knowledge could be 
modelled by Bayesian mathematics (Corlett et al., 2007). 
Emotion, personal experiences (e.g. trauma) and sociocultural factors interact with these 
neurocognitive processes to determine the theme, severity and appraisal of the delusional belief 
(Freeman & Garety, 2003), which may occur at a low/perceptual (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006) or 
high/conscious (Lerner & Keltner, 2000) level. These factors may also interact to determine the levels 
of distress and paranoia associated with the delusional belief. Once formed, delusions may fail to be 
extinguished as environmental stimuli continue to be experienced in an aberrant fashion (due to a 
perturbed dopamine system). Cognitive vulnerabilities including poor metamemory (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2006b), confirmation bias and BADE may prevent invalidation of delusional beliefs. 
Recommendations for Future Research
Our model may become further refined and updated as more empirical evidence is gathered. 
Future research should aim to explore low-level certainty and high-level confidence as two different, 
but reciprocally related processes in order to further establish the neurocognitive processes involved in 
delusions. Research should also progress further beyond the role of dopamine to investigate the role of 
other neurotransmitters in the formation and maintenance of delusions. Knowledge of other 
neurotransmitters relevant to delusions could pave the way for developing more effective 
pharmacological interventions for managing delusional beliefs. Lastly, it would be useful to extend 
research in people who are ‘at risk’ of psychosis to explicitly examine brain regions associated with 
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assessment of certainty (e.g. salience network). This would be clinically useful as metacognitive 
training programs which specifically target cognitive biases associated with delusions (e.g. JTCs, 
BADE) show promise in terms of reducing biases, belief-related distress and quality of life for people 
with delusions (Moritz et al., 2011; Moritz, Veckenstedt, Randjbar, Vitzthum, & Woodward, 2011). 
Furthermore, cognitive remediation therapy, which teaches cognitive flexibility, working memory and 
planning skills, may also attenuate high-level cognitive biases and prevent the formation of delusional 
symptoms (Wykes et al., 2007a; Wykes et al., 2007b). Mindfulness training has also been found to 
directly regulate function of the salience network (Zeidan et al., 2011), which could provide a low-
level intervention for delusions by altering people’s objective perception of their environment.
Based on the current paper, future research could test the following specific predictions:
1) That high and low-level certainty judgments differ across clinical presentations. Aberrant 
salience, BADE and JTC might be predicted to be more severe and prominent in schizophrenia than 
other presentations such as bipolar disorder and psychotic depression. This could be due to the 
increased delusion severity as well as additional cognitive vulnerabilities associated with a 
schizophrenia diagnosis (e.g. memory, attention and executive functioning; Bowie & Harvey, 2006) 
that might further interfere with the capacity to make high and low level certainty judgments.
2) That high and low level certainty judgments relate to phenomenological differences in the 
delusional experience. Specifically, biases such as JTC might be associated with complex or affective 
delusions and altered dopamine in the absence of higher-level biases may be related to passivity 
phenomena and delusions of reference. 
3) That people with delusions who report more extreme emotions and/or past trauma would 
demonstrate exaggerated alterations in high and low level certainty judgments (i.e. increased 
alterations to the dopaminergic system, aberrant salience and cognitive biases). 
4) That specific, monothematic delusions arise from a disrupted dopaminergic system and 
aberrant salience (i.e. low level certainty) but intact high level certainty judgments. To that end, that 
correction of high-level cognitive biases would significantly weaken complex delusions, but would 
have little effect on monothematic delusions or passivity phenomena.
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